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Introduction
HYPERBOLE, CALUMNY, AND APOCALYPTICA enveloped
the Buck Trust litigation ever since the San Francisco Founda-
tion {"Foundation"} filed its cy pres petition in January 1984. The
petition was characterized as a threat to the sanctity of wills and
the health of philanthropy, and as an offense against capitalism,
the American way of life, and God. Foundation personnel were said
to be corrupt and dishonest and, in the language of a Marin
County Supervisor, "grave-robbing bastards."l
To consider the merits of this case, we must hack our way out
of this thicket of rage and follow the advice Hamlet's mother gave
to Polonius, "More matter, with less art."2 Here, the "matter" is to
be discovered by looking at the Foundation's petition itself, the
rationale that undergirds it, and the relationship between that ra-
tionale and the concept of cy pres. That is the primary focus of
this Article, which is in large part adapted from two documents I
filed in support of the petition during the course of the litigation.s
1. Marin Independent Journal, July 26, 1986, at 2.
2. W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Sc. II, 1.95.
3. Declaration of John G. Simon in Support of Petition for Modification of the Terms
of Trust, In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Jan. 30, 1986, Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County);
Expert Witness Statement of John G. Simon, In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Feb. 7, 1986,
Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County).
Although I participated in the case in connection with the preparation and filing of
these documents, I did not participate as counsel to the Foundation. Accordingly, I have not
read, and do not purport to be familiar with, all the evidence taken and documents submit-
ted in this litigation and, therefore, do not offer this Article as a comprehensive review of
641
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This Article commences with a brief look at the two dominant
factors that informed the petition and their congruence with the
principles of cy pres. Next, these factors and principles, as they
arose in the Buck Trust litigation, are examined more closely, pay-
ing special attention to an over-arching theme that helps us to un-
derstand the petition: the role of the nonprofit sector, the "volun-
tary" or "independent" or "third" sector, in the American legal
order. The Article concludes with some conjectures about the con-
sequences that would have flowed from granting the petition and
with a comment on the actual, rather startling denouement of the
case.
I. THE PETITION AND CY PRES PRINCIPLES
For several months before filing the petition, the Distribution
Committee and officers of the Foundation went through the pro-
cess of trying to construe Beryl Buck's intentions in the light of
drastically changed circumstances-the posthumous increase in
the value of her gift from $7-10 million to $340 million, all to be
spent in one small and very affluent county-and, in the light of
these changed circumstances, figuring out how to discharge the
Distribution Committee's trusteeship duties. The deliberations,
even according to the two dissenting Committee members from
Marin County, were "thorough, legitimate, careful, precise ...
[and] very open" and with an "attempt to provide more light than
heat ... [and] carefully thought out ....'"
Following much study and intense debate, and the changes in
course that are an inevitable part of the business of making diffi-
cult decisions, the Foundation determined two things:
1. That, despite the indisputably "clear language" of Mrs.
Buck's will, unprecedented later economic events, resulting in
an enormous posthumous increase of her gift, had created, at a
minimum, u'ncertainty concerning Mrs. Buck's intentions, and
that this uncertainty could best be resolved by concluding that
Mrs. Buck would have permitted some part of this massive gift
to benefit neighboring counties served by the Foundation.
the Buck Trust case. Nor do I purport to offer an exposition of cy pres case law and legisla-
tion, in California or elsewhere.
4. Deposition of Richard Madden at 182-83 (Dec. 17, 1985); Deposition of Peter Behr at
193 (Jul. 17-18, 1985).
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2. That a narrower resolution of the interpretive uncertainty
not only would fail to honor the Foundation's obligations to
Mrs. Buck but would force the Foundation to allocate these
resources in an unacceptably inefficient manner, inconsistent
with the Foundation's obligations as a charitable trustee.
In light of the foregoing, but mindful of conflicting community
views, the Foundation decided to adopt what has to be viewed as a
compromise position: grants would not be confined to Marin
County, but Marin would enjoy a preferred position at all times,
and this new policy would not commence until after three more
years, or roughly $90 million more, of Marin-only grantmaking.
This position would likely have provided Marin County with many
times the amount of resources that Mrs. Buck thought she was al-
locating to Marin County.
The determinations made by the Foundation were congruent
with two principles that are at the heart of the cy pres doctrine.
First, cy pres, which is properly understood as an intent-enforcing
doctrine, seeks to avoid a frustration of donor intention arising out
of changed circumstances. IS In other words, cy pres deals with the
fact of surprise-either because the gift is irrevocable or, as in
Mrs. Buck's case, because the donor is dead. Surprise was the sub-
ject of the first of the Foundation's determinations. Second, cy
pres seeks to avoid charitable waste-to preserve what Professor
Karst called "the efficiency of the charitable dollar."e Where the
donor's plan, if carried out in unreconstructed fashion would be
"illegal," "impossible," "impractical,"7 "inexpedient,"8 "unsuita-
ble,"9 "unwise,"lo or of diminished "usefulness"ll or "signifi-
cance,"12 to use the language of judicial, legislative, and scholarly
authorities over the years, cy pres offers a way to restore the bene-
5. 4 A.W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399.2, at 3094 (3d ed. 1967).
6. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility,
73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960).
7. The first three adjectives are the most commonly used. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 399 (1977).
8. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 439, at 560 (2d
rev. ed. 1977).
9. Alemany v. Wensinger, 40 Cal. 288, 293 (1970).
10. A.W. SCOTT, supra note 5, § 399.4, at 3124.
11. Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 435 (1884), cited in G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT. supra
note 8, § 431, at 491.
12. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan, 182 S.E. 2d 356, 358-59 (N.C. 1971).
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faction to full power. This theme of efficiency was the subject of
the Foundation's second determination to which I have referred.
The two factors of surprise and efficiency interact. Where the
charitable purpose is illegal, no specific finding of surprise result-
ing from changed circumstances is required. IS Even in this situa-
tion it could be said that cy pres plays an intent-enforcing or sur-
prise-avoiding role for no donor would have. wanted to see his or
her gift wiped out on the grounds of illegality. But as one moves
away from clear cases of "illegality" or "impossibility," the impor-
tance of surprise increases. Thus, a determination by charitable
trustees that they cannot operate effectively under donor-imposed
constraints (whether they assert "impracticability" or one of the
other difficulties listed above) probably would not support a cy
pres order in the absence of significant surprise. Where the condi-
tions that produce charitable 'inefficiency are not very different
from those the donor experienced, or might reasonably have antici-
pated' the donor may be assumed to have known what he or she
was doing. In such a case there is no basis for others (including
trustees) "to substitute their judgment for that of the trus-
tor-however wrong-headed most people might consider that judg-
ment to have been."14
Where there has been major surprise, however, one cannot as-
sume that the donor acted knowingly, that he or she intended or
contemplated the inefficient outcome, and it is therefore appropri-
ate for the trustees, with court approval, to reinterpret the donor's
will to protect the donor gift from an unintended miscarriage
caused by changed circumstances. Such reinterpretation, Mitchell
Polinsky has contended, "enhances the value of the charitable
trust to the testator since, if circumstances change, he or she can
rely on the trustee and the court to fill in the 'gaps' in the charita-
ble trust in a way that promotes the testator's interests."Ili Simi-
larly, Richard Posner has stated that, where there have been
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1977).
14. Communication from Stephen Bomse, counsel to the San Francisco Foundation
during the Buck Trust litigation, to the author (Dec. I, 1987). I am indebted to Mr. Bomse
for commenting on an earlier draft of this Article.
15. Expert Witness Statement of A. Mitchell Polinsky at 12, In re Estate of Buck, No.
23259 (Jan. 24, 1986, Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County). Professor Polinsky's testimony was
rejected by the court on grounds of relevance; the quotation comes from his proffered
testimony.
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changed conditions, "A policy of rigid adherence to the letter of
the donative instrument is likely to frustrate both the donor's pur-
poses and the efficient use of resources. illS
The interaction between the factors of surprise and- efficiency
has a second consequence: the fact of surprise alone, without a
finding of inefficiency, is not likely to support cy pres. Where the
trustees find that they can continue to make productive use of the
gift, even though the underlying conditions have significantly
changed, adherence to the donor's express language will probably
not, in Richard Posner's words, frustrate either "the donor's pur-
poses [or] the efficient use of resources."l7
This brief sketch of the role played by the surprise and effi-
ciency concepts is based on the logic of the basic intent-enforcing
and resource-conserving purposes of cy pres rather than on the ex-
isting case law. That case law is not well developed in the factual
context of the Buck Trust case. What precedents there are do not
give consistent guidance,18 making it difficult to predict how the
case would have been decided had it been fully litigated in Califor-
nia19 or had it arisen in another state.
Because, however, it is my contention that the case law, if it is
to honor the basic purposes of cy pres" should generally follow the
contours of the surprise-efficiency analysis, the surprise and effi-
ciency themes deserve the following, more detailed scrutiny in the
context of the Buck Trust litigation.
II. THE CONCEPT OF SURPRISE
A. Intent-Agnosticism
The trigger to the application of the cy pres doctrine in the
Buck Trust case was surprise. This was, after all, not a case in
which a donor left what she believed to be $340 million to be spent
all in one small, affluent county and where an attempt was made to
alter this disposition. This was instead a case where a donor left
what she believed to be $7 to $10 million for that purpose, and
16. R.A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 390 (2d ed. 1977).
17. Id.
18. Pertinent cases are discussed in Comment, Cy Pres Inexpediency and the Buck
Trust, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 577 (1986) and in Trial Brief of the San Francisco Foundation, In re
Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Jan. 23, 1986, Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County).
19. See infra text at note 61.
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after her death an unprecedented surprise produced a forty-fold
increase in the size of the benefaction.
Such a dramatic leap in the level of the gift, taking it from a
respectable but unspectacular level to one of the two dozen largest
charitable funds in the country20 (and probably the world), un-
avoidably raises this question: is it reasonable to assume that a do-
nor's distributional pattern will be the same for X dollars as for
40X dollars? If I have shares of stock that I think are worth $1,000
and I am about to give them to my church at Christmas time, and
at the last moment I am told that the shares of stock are worth
$40,000, is it clear, or even likely, that I will give all of the stock to
the church? Mrs. Buck had created a trust that reasonably might
have been calculated to produce $750,000 a year for Marin County;
if, on the eve of executing her will, or at a later time when there
was still an opportunity to change it, she had been told that the
property would produce $30 million a year-and knowing, as she
must have, that there were other charitable needs and opportuni-
ties outside of Marin County in the San Francisco Bay
Area-would such a surprise have affected her charitable program?
I suggest that it contradicts common sense and our knowledge of
ourselves as human beings to deny that her intentions might well
have been modified by the timely receipt of this information.
In fact, of course, the tidings arrived after Mrs. Buck's death;
the surprise was not timely. However, that fact does not eliminate
the need to consider the consequences of surprise. It means only
that death cut short Mrs. Buck's own opportunity to respond.
Those who lived after her and were made responsible for translat-
ing and implementing her charitable goals, the officers and Distri-
bution Committee members of the San Franciscio Foundation,
were left to grapple with the reality of this major posthumous
surprise.
At this point in the analysis, assuming no further information
about intention, the fact of significant surprise would leave us in a
condition that may be called "intent-agnostic." In other words, the
fact of drastically changed circumstances would generate uncer-
tainty about Mrs. Buck's intentions. This uncertainty enti-
tled-indeed, as I shall suggest, required-the Foundation, the in-
stitution Mrs. Buck designated to carry out her charitable purpose,
20. See Appendix, Table 1.
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to enlist the attention and cooperation of the court in a reexamina-
tion that would address the puzzle caused by this "intent-agnostic"
situation.
That does not mean, as some have suggested, that modest dis-
crepancies should cause such reexamination. Few donors know pre-
cisely what their estates will be worth or how the market value of
their assets will fluctuate. The law cannot deal with minor shifts
that are too small to cast us into an "intent-agnostic" situation.
But the law has to be able to cope with the truly exceptional sur-
prise. In commercial transactions, the law copes with major sur-
prise, under the "commercial impracticability" doctrine, where un-
foreseen supply shortage has caused a "marked" cost increase,21 or,
under contract law doctrine, when an "extreme and unreasonable"
increase in cost may excuse non-performance.22 For cy pres pur-
poses, whatever criterion of surprise may be used, the facts here
would surely meet it and exceed it. The late Justice Potter Stew-
art's famous remark, "I know it when I see it,"23 mayor may not
have been a satisfactory way of determining the existence of hard-
core pornography, but when it comes to determining the existence·
of extraordinary surprise for cy pres purposes, in Mrs. Buck's case
we have seen it.
B. The Philanthropic Standard
The facts of the Buck Trust case permit us to go one step fur-
ther then to say that we are "intent-agnostic." We do in fact know
a fair amount about the impact of the scale of wealth on philan-
thropic behavior and what happens to donative patterns when a
donor finds himself or herself in the very biggest philanthropic
league. Tables 1 and 2 set forth the record of large-scale founda-
tion philanthropy in recent decades.24
Table 1 lists the sixty-three foundations that appear on either
of two lists of fifty largest American foundations, a list ranked by
assets and a list ranked by annual grants, together with informa-
tion about each foundation's geographic scope and subject-matter
21. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 (1972).
22. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932).
23. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
24. See Appendix.
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coverage.26 Large as these foundations are, most of them are much
smaller than the Buck Trust; valuing the Buck Trust's assets and
grants as of June 30, 1982, it would rank nineteenth in grants and
twenty-first in assets among the sixty-three foundations in Table 1.
Table 2 is a list, as comprehensive as possible, of gifts and be-
quests exceeding $30 million made to foundations during the
preceeding thirty years with information about each foundation's
geographic scope and subject-matter coverage.26
What emerges is a pattern of philanthropic behavior that is,
with the solitary exception of the Buck Trust, remarkably consis-
tent, so much so that we can refer to it here as "the philanthropic
standard." We may describe the standard this way:
Large-scale charitable giving, regardless of the particular objec-
tives it pursues, serves a community that is broadly defined in
terms of population size and socioeconomic class. In its in-
fancy, a foundation's charitable program may be narrowly con-
stricted, with severe limits on the size and shape of the benefi-
ciary community. But as the resources grow, the giving
program reaches out beyond its parochial origins to address a
more populous and diverse slice of humanity. In short, charity
may begin at home, but large-scale charity does not stay
there.27
25. The contributions that created these foundations were not all recent gifts; some
were made during the earlier decades of this century. The giving patterns followed by the
foundations themselves, however, reflect modern-day philanthropic behavior and therefore
are properly included in a discussion of large-scale giving patterns in recent decades.
26. I am grateful to Mr. John A. Swain, formerly a student at Yale Law School, for
assembling these Tables and for other research assistance.
27. A few of the foundations listed in Table 1 illustrate the textual observation that a
charitable fund may begin with a narrow compass and then undergo expansion of purpose
and program, proportional to size. Sometimes this happens when the fund itself grows; the
Ford Foundation's grantmaking activities expanded dramatically, from a focus on certain
charities in Dearborn, Michigan and Detroit, to a national and even global orientation, when
bequests from the Ford family in the 1950's brought about an enormous growth in assets.
The program expansion may also result from a recognition by the fund managers that mas-
sive resources should be deployed to meet major challenges. The Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation-as of 1982 at roughly the same grantmaking level as the Buck
Trust-furnishes an example. During the years following a major infusion of assets in 1963,
the Foundation moved from predominant focus on Flint, Michigan to engagement in a vari-
ety of national programs, representing somewhat more than half of all annual expenditures.
Flint, it may be noted, has a population with notorious unemployment and significant social
and economic problems. Even so, the Mott Foundation trustees found it important to cast a
wider net: "From [the) start, the Foundation's major concern has been the well-being of the
community .... This interest has continued to find expression in Flint and also has taken
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To clear up some of the misconceptions about this philan-
thropic standard, it must be stressed that it is not a legal standard
to be imposed by courts or legislatures on charitable donors. It is
simply a factual description of a pattern of donative behavior-a
description that may help us to ascertain what Mrs. Buck might
have done had she known the true scope of her benefaction.
What explains this standard? There are several possible expla-
nations, three of which will be briefly discussed here. One draws on
the history of philanthropy, another invokes the "general economic
theory of demand," and a third refers to principles of
proportionality.
1. Historical Explanation
The philanthropic standard so uniformly reflected in the Ta-
bles is not simply a trend of the times. The concept that large-
scale charity addresses itself to a world beyond the donor's home
parish and to a wide variety of human conditions, has its origins in
concepts that date from the early history of almsgiving. These con-
cepts have been reiterated across centuries of philanthropy, and
are reinforced in America by developments in federal and state tax
law. 28
Biblical concern for the relief of "the stranger" and the poor
introduce us to a concept of charity that transcends a donor's fa-
miliar and affluent world: "And when ye reap the harvest of your
land, thou shalt not make clean riddance of the corners of thy field
when thou reapest, neither shalt thou gather any gleaning of thy
harvest: thou shalt leave them unto the poor, and the stranger
••••"29 Jesus' passage on the sheep and the goats describes the
blessed state of those who tend to the stranger: "For I was
hungered, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me
drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in ...."30 Similarly, a
celebrated twelfth century restatement of Jewish law, by Rabbi:
Maimonides, reiterates both themes, declaring that the highest two
levels of charitable worthiness are occupied by (1) "the person who
us far beyond our home city." CHARLES STEWART MOTT FOUNDATION, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(1980).
28. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
29. Leviticus, 23:22 (King James).
30. Matthew, 25:35 (King James).
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assists a poor Jew ... by putting him where he can dispense with
people's aid;" (2) "one who gives alms ... in such manner that the
giver knows not to whom he gives and the recipient knows not
from whom he takes."SI
The secular tradition of charity has also emphasized these ele-
ments. In the Roman Empire "private citizens established . . . or-
ganizations which supplied food, clothing and education to needy
children."S2 Strangers were the object of Herodes Atticus' charity
in the second century. "In the Greek tradition of broad gifts for
the populace as a whole," Herodes, although a citizen of Athens,
"gave a water supply to the city of Troas, a theatre to Corinth, a
stadium to Delphi, aqueducts for Canusium in Italy, baths for
Thermopylae."ss Similarly, Cosimo the Elder, one of the founders
of the Medici dynasty, did not restrict his philanthropy to his Flor-
entine headquarters. "Even in distant Jerusalem he endowed a
hospice for the use of pilgrims."s,
The Anglo-American legal tradition has reinforced these
themes ever since the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses,slI which
listed as the first example of charitable activity to be legally pro-
tected the "relief of aged, impotent and poor people," and which
specified the relief of "poor maids" and "poor inhabitants" as leg-
islatively recognized objects of charity. This concept was reiterated
almost 400 years later in an English tax case that produced a cele-
brated legal definition of charity.S6
A reminder of the "stranger" theme is found in the major dis-
tinction the Internal Revenue Code makes between (a) social clubs,
horticultural societies, business leagues and other mutual benefit
associations, groups established mainly to provide reciprocal assis-
tance among friends, colleagues or co-workers, and (b) "public ser-
vice" organizations that seek to support a wider range of purposes
and activities lying beyond peer-group interchange and collabora-
31. MOSES BEN MAIMON, A. MAIMONIDES READER 136-37 (1 TWERSKY ED. 1972).
32. E. FISCH, D. FREED & E. SCHACTER, CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 10
(1974). See also A. WARNER, AMERICAN CHARITIES 4 (1908).
33. W. WEAVER, U.S. PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS: THEIR HISTORY, STRUCTURE, MANAGE-
MENT, AND RECORD 7-8 (1967).
34. 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 191 (1960).
35. 43 Eliz. I, c. 4.
36. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, 1891 A.C. 531,
583.
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tion.37 Both categories of organization are exempt from income
tax,38 but only groups in the latter category-the one that is more
oriented to strangers-are classified as "charitable" and entitled to
receive contributions that are deductible from income, estate, and
gift taxes.39
These tax law echoes of older notions of charity are buttressed
by an important consequence of charitable status under the federal
tax laws. This status provides the donor with a reduction in in-
come, estate or gift taxes that would otherwise be taxed at progres-
sive rates and subsequently spent for the benefit of the entire na-
tion-that is, for the benefit of strangers. I do not suggest that
charitable giving must replicate these allocative features of the fed-
eral tax and expenditure process, because that would undermine
the pluralistic reasons for tax deductibility. But the fact that the
tax system, from which the charitable donor is permitted benefits
to the extent of his or her deductible giving, has these distribu-
tional aspects helps to explain the survival in modern tax law of
the venerable concepts of traditional charity.'9
2. "Economics of Demand"
Turning from history to economics, one encounters another
explanation for the donative pattern reflected in the philanthropic
standard. Kenneth Arrow, in a statement filed in the Buck case,
offered the following rationale based in part on the "general eco-
nomic theory of demand": .
If one looks at spending in any field, one generalization always
holds. Spending on different items virtually never rises propor-
tionally to purchasing power. To draw an analogy, we know
that at very low levels of income, individuals spend a dominant
part of their income on food, as they do today in very poor
countries. As income rises, the proportion spent on food de-
37. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3)-(22), 2055(a), 2552(a) (West Supp. 1986).
38. Id. § 501(c)(3)-(22).
39. Id. §§ 170, 2055(a), 2522(a).
40. I make this point without taking a position on whether the tax deduction represents
a "subsidy," or "tax expenditure," as is commonly asserted, or an implementation of the
theory that moneys contributed to charity should not be counted as part of one's taxable
income. For the former interpretation, see S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CON-
CEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 223-32 (1973). For the latter interpretation, see Andrews, Per-
sonal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972) and Bittker, Chari-
table Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 47-49 (1972).
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clines and that on shelter and clothing rises. More striking,
commodities that are not purchased at all at low income levels
enter the budget, for example, automobiles or travel to foreign
countries.
We have no reason to doubt that the same is true of chari-
table bequests. As the size of the estate rises, we expect not a
simple expansion of the same kinds of expenditures but a
growing variety. There are gains to concentrating expenditures
when the total levels are low, but as the aggregate rises, we
expect activities not previously deemed worthwhile to be en-
couraged. The good that can be achieved in a narrow area, de-
fined geographically or functionally, is exhausted, and we may
reasonably suppose the testator to be aware that this will be
the case and to provide for a broader set of charitable
activities.41
3. Proportionality Principle
Finally, and most simply, there is the principle of proportion-
ality, familiar in other contexts: a punishment should fit the crime,
self-defense should be proportionate to the threat, proportionality
explains beauty. Philanthropy's version of this principle is that the
impact area of charitable giving is roughly proportionate to the
amounts involved.
The proportionality principle is noteworthy because it helps
both to explain and to describe the donative behavior that is part
of the philanthropic standard and that is documented in the Ta-
bles. What is remarkable about the Buck Trust is that it departs
so dramatically from this prevailing behavior. The Buck Trust is
the only example of large-scale giving I have been able to find that
does not observe the principle of proportionality.
C. Application of the Philanthropic Standard to the
Buck Trust
At this point one may ask: Why does the Buck Trust depart so
dramatically from the standard apparently followed by every other
major philanthropy-and from the precepts of history, economics
and proportionality we have just mentioned? The answer that
41. Expert Witness Statement of Kenneth Arrow, In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Jan.
24, 1986, Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County).
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stares us in the face is posthumous surprise. Mrs. Buck did not
know the true size of her benefaction-no one did-until after her
death. The gift she thought she was making was not inconsistent
with the philanthropic standard. But her gift turned out, in fact,
to be so grossly out of line with that standard as to require the
Foundation and the court, because cy pres is an intent-enforcing
procedure,42 to consider the possibility of an amendment of her
dispositive scheme, an amendment that death prevented her from
undertaking on her own.
In many areas of the law drastic surprise, affecting the basic
factual assumptions of the parties, permits the reconstruction of
the parties' arrangements: contracts are reformed, treaty obliga-
tions restructured, marriages annulled. It is true that in the law of
private trusts we do not vary so readily. If I leave equal sums to
my children, and one strikes oil while the other suffers a cata-
strophic illness, my trustees may be able to obtain an emergency
invasion of principal for the latter child but not a basic realloca-
tion of trust income. Charitable trusts are different, however; the
cy pres doctrine applies to them and is not available for private
trusts. An understanding of this difference necessitates a consider-
ation of the role of the nonprofit sector in America.
D. The "Third Sector" and Its Implications
The fact that the United States is not a binary society ex-
plains, in part, why the law can deal with "surprise" in charitable
trusts but can not generally do so in the case of private trusts.
America is not populated solely by private individuals and 'institu-
tions owning personal or corporate property on the one hand, and
state agencies presiding over public property on the other hand.
Likewise, the work of the society is not carried on only by private
actors operating in their own personal or corporate self-interest
and by governmental actors obeying electoral majorities.
A distinguishing characteristic of the American social order,
remarkable to de Tocqueville as a foreign visitor 150 years ago,43 is
that it does not rely exclusively on "private sector" or "public sec-
tor" actors to carry out the nation's business. Instead, there is ma-
jor dependence on a third, nonprofit sector to teach us, heal us,
42. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
43. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA' 306 (P. Bradley rev. ed. 1956).
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entertain us, expand our scientific and cultural frontiers, and pro-
tect our rights, opportunities, and natural resources. With the pos-
sible exception of Israel, no other country approaches America's
reliance on the nonprofit sector to shoulder important social and
economic tasks. Although social clubs, trade associations, labor un-
ions, and many other "mutual benefit" groups are part of the non-
profit sector, the emphasis here is on the "charitable" groups-the
schools, hospitals, churches, social service bodies, and other "pub-
lic interest"H organizations embraced by section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code.·11 A crucial source of nourishment for this
charitable sector is private philanthropy: individual, corporate, and
foundation giving, amounting to $87 billion in 1986.•6
There are many explanations for this country's reliance on the
nonprofit sector. Some economists see the nonprofit organization
as a vehicle that provides some assurance to donors or consumers
that their gifts or contracts will be honored, in contexts where they
would have difficulty policing the performance of for-profit firms.·7
Other economists view the charitable world as the provider of
"public" or "collective" goods, those yielding external benefits to
the larger society, in situations where a majority of the electorate is
not willing to use appropriated funds for these purposes.·8 Some
political scientists and lawyers view the nonprofit sector as provid-
44. The "mutual benefit" and "public interest" descriptions come from Bittker &
Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85
YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
45. I.R.C. §50l(c)(3) (1986). Subsection (3) of section 50l(c) provides:
(c) List of Exempt Organizations....
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children· or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legisla-
tion (except as otherwise in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Id.
46. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA (1987).
47. See, e.g., Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
48. See, e.g., B. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1977).
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ing goods and services that the government cannot constitutionally
provide (like reiigious functions), or cannot practically provide
(like evaluation of government itself), or is unlikely to offer in a
diverse, innovative fashion because of majoritarian constraints.49
Some historians explain the prevalence of nonprofits by pointing to
a Colonial-era distrust of big governme~t, and a resulting quest for
decentralization. Other observers seek out more "affirmative" ex-
planations for the use of nonprofits: they recruit and deploy volun-
tary labor; they contribute to the building of associational and
community values; they permit a spirit of caring and altruism to
express itself-or, more simply, they were the form of non-family
organization that came first, ahead of government or business, and
therefore possibly the "first sector."
What most of these explanations have in common is their per-
ception of the charitable world as a setting that avoids the con-
straints and liabilities of the purely "private" or "public" sectors
that are dominated, respectively, by market and ballot, while
drawing from the strengths of each of them. Thus, the charitable
organization and the philanthropy that supports it are driven,
more than any government activity is driven, by an individual
choice system of decision-making. Yet these decisions must be in-
formed, more than in the case of any purely private actor, by an
overriding obligation to perform in the public interest. This obliga-
tion, in the case of a charitable trust (or a charitable corporation)
can be seen as a corollary of the state's supportive and regulatory
role. That role is rather pronounced:
The trust becomes operative only after a court has found, ei-
ther specifically or by inference, that it is charitable. Nor has
government remained neutral. To encourage a continuous flow
of funds into philanthropic enterprises, it bestows privileges, of
which tax immunity is only one. The state creates and defines
charitable trusts, grants them perpetual existence, modernizes
them through cy pres, appoints and regulates the trustees, ap-
proves accounts, construes ambiguous language in the trust
charter and sometimes goes so far as to impose a less stringent
standard of tort liability on such trusts than on their private
counterparts.GO
49. See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY?: THE CASE FOR ATHIRD SECTOR (1983).
50. E. Clark, Charitable Trust, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1003-04 (1957).
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The hybrid quality of the nonprofit sector in general, and the
charitable trust in particular, was overlooked in much of the argu-
mentation offered by the opponents of the Foundation's petition.
A binary view, containing only the pure-private or pure-public
models, dominated the rhetoric. The pure-private model was in-
voked when Mrs. Buck's language was construed as a private testa-
mentary choice, the kind one makes when dividing up property
within the family. Thus, the rhetoric of the litigation was replete
with talk about "breaking the will" and other language that is ap-
propriate to the pure-private model. The pure-public model ap-
peared to be attributed to the Foundation, as though it were claim-
ing government-like power, an effort to wield the power of kings
over Mrs. Buck's legacy, regardless of her intention.
A binary view of the world not only encourages hyperbolic ar-
gument, but it also precludes understanding of the cy pres doctrine
and why it should have been available in this case. Thus, if Mrs.
Buck's bequest is viewed like a private family benefaction, cy pres
looms as a threat to her autonomy and to the security of her last
will and testament. The charitable donor, however, operates from
the very start in the hybrid setting. His or her individual choice is
honored, not (as in the pure-private setting) for its own sake-to
protect the right of the donor to dispose of private personal prop-
erty for private personal ends-but because individual choice is an
allocative mechanism far better suited than governmental choice to
achieve the diversity, pluralism, and decentralization that are the
special virtues of the third sector. In short, individual choice is
thought to assist the nonprofit sector to operate in the public in-
terest. Indeed, the charitable donor is assumed to be exercising his
or her choice for the very purpose of furthering the public interest,
as compared to the personal or family goals that are properly at-
tributed to the non-charitable donor. That is, in fact, a major pre-
mise underlying federal income and estate tax deductibility for
charitable gifts. III Indeed, in the Buck case, the donor evidenced
such a general charitable intent.
.Because individual choice exercised in the charitable setting
is inextricably connected to advancement of the public interest,
the law provides a mechanism to prevent the connection from be-
ing broken. Cy pres is the vehicle by which the law ensures that
51. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 21 U.S.F. L. Rev.  657 1986-1987
Summer 1987) PUBLIC POLICY AND THE BUCK TRUST 657
changed circumstances will not result in a situation where literal
obeisance to the donor's text departs from what a public-interest-
regarding donor probably would have intended had he or she lived
to witness and respond to the drastic change.
The resulting irony is that the way the charitable nonprofit
sector copes with changed circumstances, where testamentary
transfers are concerned, turns out to be more respectful of individ-
ual choice than the way in which the pure-private sector handles
the same problem. Strict, literal obeisance to a donor's text, the
rule for non-charitable trusts, often turns out not to be the best
way of faithfully interpreting donative purpose. The fact that the
cy pres doctrine, with its intent-enforcing capability, provides a su-
perior opportunity to respect individual choice is one aspect of the
Buck Trust litigation that was not grasped by those who referred
to it as a "will-breaking" enterprise.
The character of the American nonprofit sector thus contrib-
utes to an understanding of the issue of surprise in the Buck Trust
case. It also illuminates the other issue that played a part in the
Foundation's decision to seek cy pres: the issue of charitable
efficiency.
III. THE ISSUE OF EFFICIENCY
Surprise, even stupendous surprise, is not enough to bring
about the final cy pres order reconstructing a donor's literal plan.
There· must also be a finding that the unreconstructed pattern is
not serving the interests of efficient philanthropy. I have used "ef-
ficiency" language, but such a finding can be expressed in various
ways. The judicial, legislative, and scholarly cy pres authorities
cited earlier52 have used several adjectives ("impracticable," "inex-
pedient," etc.) to describe the occasion for modification in the face
of changed circumstances. As noted above,53 where there is no sur-
prise, such an inefficiency finding, except in cases of illegality or
impossibility, would probably not support a cy pres order. Presum-
ably, a donor, in the presence of all the facts, can command sub-
standard charity. But surprise should open the door to a finding of
charitable inefficiency.
52. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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A. The Trustees' Role
In the first instance it is typically the trustees or other charita-
ble fiduciaries entrusted with the donor's gift who make a finding
of inefficiency and propose a remedy. The law permits the trustees
to take the lead.Ii. Indeed, while the court has the final word, the
trustees appear to have a duty to address the problem in the first
instance.
Although it might seem inappropriate to let private persons
make a finding that the public interest is not being effectively
served as a result of changed conditions, it would be inconsistent
with the values of diversity, pluralism, and decentralization to turn
this function of explication over to a government(al agency. Cy pres
has a better way, one that grows out of the donor-trustee relation-
ship and out of the hybrid nature of the third sector.
In the American system of private philanthropy, it is the
trustees, of a foundation or other recipient body, to whom the do-
nor entrusts funds for deployment. Once the donor is gone, the
trustees serve as the donor's vicar, giving meaning and reality to
the gift. In accordance with that relationship, the trustees play the
paramount role of translation and implementation, subject to judi-
cial review.
This donor-trustee relationship, in turn, reflects the underly-
ing structure of the nonprofit sector in the United States. The non-
profit organization, managed by its trustees, is the central actor in
this sector. Thus, charitable groups and their trustees receive,
manage, and dispense the nation's philanthropic resources. Their
decisions give shape to the voluntary sector. The dominant role of
these groups is respected in the federal tax laws, which permit only
organizations to receive deductible contributions; person-to-person
altruism does not qualify.1i1i Similarly, state property tax laws rec-
ognize only the organization as entitled to the charitable exemp-
tion. lie State statutes, in turn, subject these organizations to control
by their trustees.
The responsibility that the law imposes on charitable organi-
54. E. FISCH, D. FREED & E. SCHACHTER, CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 462
(1974) (trustees as well as the attorney general may apply to the court for application of cy
pres).
55. I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055 (West Supp. 1986).
56. See e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214 (West Supp. 1987).
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zations and their trustees includes, as I have noted, an initiating
role in cy pres litigation. It follows that charitable trustees also
have the authority to play a leading part in the cy pres decision-
making process. Once the fact of major "surprise" has been estab-
lished, what the trustees find and recommend with respect to the
need for a cy pres solution should have the benefit of a presump-
tion of correctness, analogous to the presumption that favors the
directors of a business corporation under the "business judgment
rule." As long as the reviewing court finds that the trustees are
acting in good faith and within the conventional bounds of reason,
the trustees have the responsibility and the authority to make a
finding that changed circumstances have resulted in inefficient or
ineffective pursuit of the public interest.
Just as a binary view of the legal order (pure-public vs. pure-
private) precludes a proper understanding of the cy pres doctrine
itself, so a binary view cannot accommodate the trustee role set
forth here. Under a binary view, either the state becomes the dom-
inant decision-maker, or no one does; the binary view does not ac-
cept the hybrid notion of private fiduciaries deciding how best to
carry out public purposes. Private actors in a binary world would
mind their own business. As the "third sector" expression itself
tells us, however, that is not the world we inhabit.
B. The Trustees' Role Under Assault
The Foundation, as trustee of the Buck Trust, sought to exer-
cise its duty and authority in the cy pres process. The trustee's
governing body, the Distribution Committee of the Foundation,
took such action on the basis of its conclusion, not only that there
had been posthumous surprise of monumental proportions, but
that the resulting situation forced the Foundation to engage in
substandard grantmaking. The Foundation sought to explain this
conclusion at the trial by comparing, in terms of efficacy, the
grants made in Marin County to the grants that could not be made
in the other counties served by the Foundation. The Foundation
did not assert that needs were "saturated" in Marin County, or in
other words, that there was no remaining "need" at all for the
projects being funded in that county. Instead, it sought to show
that, because of the level and urgency of unmet needs in the other
counties, the productivity of grant dollars being spent in Marin
was not as high as the productivity of the grant dollars that could
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have been spent elsewhere in the Bay Area.
The trial court excluded this testimony on the ground that the
Foundation's criterion of inefficiency, one of relative inefficiency,
was unacceptable. The court's notion of inefficiency became clear
later on. After the case had been settled among the principal par-
ties, and the Foundation's cy pres petition had been withdrawn,
the court ruled negatively on a demand by a group of intervenors
to grant the Foundation's petition. Although stating that ineffi-
ciency was not the proper legal standard-only "illegality, impossi-
bility, or strict impracticability" would sufficeli7-the court never-
theless devoted a considerable part of its opinion to its own ideas
about inefficiency. The Foundation could have been more effective
in Marin County, the court stated, if it had been willing to make
endowment grants, if it had funded religious and medical research
programs, if it had not insisted on 50% matching for capital
grants, if it had been more initiatory, less reactive, more risk-
taking.1i8
In short, the trial court rejected the trustees' assessment of
efficiency and substituted its own philanthropic preferences. Some
readers of this Article may find the court's philanthropic views
more appealing than the Foundation's. But it is a fact that Mrs.
Buck did not name the superior court of California as her trustee;
for better or for worse, she named the Foundation. Moreover, the
court's rejection of the trustee's role in the cy pres process ignores
the role charitable trustees play in the nonprofit sector. The result
allows an agency of the state to become the grantmaking supervi-
sor, thus undermining the decentralized, or "privatized," structure
so carefully nurtured in our legal order.
The court's role, indeed, has been carried a step further. On
July 25, 1986, the Attorney General of the State of California, the
County of Marin, and the Marin Council of Agencies entered into
an agreement, which was adopted by the court six days later, pro-
viding that 20 to 25 % of income from the newly reconstituted
Buck Trust would be set aside for one to three "major projects" of
"national and international importance," that a hearing would be
held by the court in July 1987, and that at the conclusion of the
57. In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259, slip op. at 98 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County Aug.
15, 1986).
58. Id. at 33-47.
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hearing, "the court may select one or more projects to be funded
by the Buck Trust as determined by the court."119
On August 7, 1987, the court directed that Buck Trust funds
be allocated in certain prescribed amounts to three "major
projects": The Buck Center on Aging, Institute on Alcohol and
Other Drug Problems, and Marin Educational Institute. The court
appointed a special master to monitor all three "major projects,"
approve their budgets, and attend all meetings of their governing
bodies. The court ordered that it would "review the progress and
operations of each major project annually" and reserved the right
to impose additional conditions, to alter any project's Buck Trust
funding, or to modify or terminate it as a Buck Trust beneficiary.so
Whatever one's view of the Buck Trust case, this result should
be arresting to anyone who cares about private philanthropy in the
United States. The superior court has removed from the Buck
Trust management and reserved to itself the right to decide how a
major part of Beryl Buck's legacy will be used to help the nation or
the world. The binary view triumphs. Philanthropy has "gone pub-
lic" with a vengeance.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
A. Conjectures About Outcomes and Consequences
1. Ultimate Result?
If the Buck Trust case had been fully litigated and then re-
viewed by the California Supreme Court, what would have been
the outcome? Would the court have supported the trial judge's
opinion that only "illegality, impossibility or strict impracticabil-
ity" supports a cy pres modification? Or would recognition of the
intent-enforcing and efficiency-preserving policies of cy pres have
led the California Supreme Court to take into account posthumous
surprise, the "philanthropic standard," and the decisional role of
charitable trustees-and thereupon reach a favorable response to
59. The Agreement Among Attorney General, John K. Van de Kamp, Marin County,
and the Marin Council of Agencies at 5, In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Jul. 25, 1986, Cal.
Super. Ct., Marin County) [hereinafter Agreement]. The "major projects" provision was
adopted in the Order for Appointment of Successor Distribution Trustee, In re Estate of
Buck, No. 23259 (Jul. 31, 1986, Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County) [hereinafter July 31 Order].
60. Order Establishing Major Projects and Related Matters, In re Estate of Buck, No.
23259 (Aug. 7, 1987, Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County).
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the petition? The judicial precedents can be said to point in both
directions;61 the final result would not have been an easy call.
2. The Chilling of Charity?
Let us suppose, however, that the California Supreme Court
had approved a modification of the Buck Trust terms. Some ob-
servers feared that such a result would chill future charitable giv-
ing, by leading donors to worry that their intentions count for
naught. I am persuaded that there is little basis for such a predic-
tion. The only accurate message a Buck Trust cy pres order could
have sent to the world of potential donors is this one:
If an extraordinary event multiplies your bequest beyond any
size you could possibly have imagined, and if you had imposed
narrow restrictions on your bequest not anticipating this cir-
cumstance, and if the trustees you have selected to carry out
your wishes decide that your gift cannot be put to efficient use
given the narrow restrictions, and if a court finds that the
trustees are acting reasonably and in good faith, then the court
may authorize the trustees to spend some of the income on
closely related charitable objectives, still leaving the original
objects of your bounty with several times what you thought
you were giving them.
Perhaps this is not how donors would have understood the
point of a Buck Trust modification. More difficult and subtle les-
sons, however, have been successfully communicated to affected
populations, as a result of past court decisions. Those potential do-
nors who grasped the Buck Trust message would have had no rea-
son to cut their charitable bequests. The conditions such a message
spells out are rare enough to approximate the "100-year flood."
And those who did not like the message could word· their wills to
specify a response in the event of the 100-year flood.
Furthermore, past experience points away from a chilling ef-
fect on gifts. It is my understanding that the rate of giving to the
Foundation did not decline in the wake of the filing of the Buck
Trust petition in early 1984. Indeed, the late Austin Wakeman
Scott wrote that giving in England actually increased following cy
pres developments that were much more unsettling to donors than
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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any message the Buck Trust case could send.62
Not only would harm to philanthropy have been improbable
as a result of a Buck Trust modification; long-run positive benefits
would have been likely. These are difficult days for the nonprofit
sector and for the process of philanthropy that largely supports it.
Voluntary organizations are being asked to shoulder an increasing
share of society's tasks in the wake of a reduction in the federal
government's social role. This effort requires increasing reliance on
donations from the general public and supportive legislation that
provides favorable federal tax treatment and postal rates, generous
property tax exemptions, and a modest level of regulation. It is not
easy to maintain a favorable climate for such philanthropic and
legislative assistance without public confidence in the fairness and
equity of the philanthropic system. In Western .Europe, private
philanthropy has been under attack both because it is controlled
by the "rich and powerful" and because "[slome charities such as
private schools or hospitals are seen as havens of wealthy privilege
••••"63 Similar sentiments about private foundations in the
United States contributed to the passage of restrictive legislation
in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Another season of public or legisla-
tive hostility is not out of the question for the charitable commu-
nity, particularly if trustees are prevented from taking what is es-
sentially a form of philanthropic self-regulation to cope with
bizarre situations like this one. The perception of an adventitious
windfall, from the Buck Trust, that lets the "rich get richer"-and
that philanthropic mechanisms can do nothing to correct-could
contribute to the apprehension that philanthropy, despite the tax
"subsidy" it enjoys from the public at large, is an avenue to "wel-
fare for the rich."
This concern would not have been, and is not, an appropriate
basis for judicial approval of a cy pres petition. The Foundation's
petition had to be justified on the other grounds discussed in this
Article. But the possibility that cy pres, in the circumstances of the
Buck Trust case, could protect respect for and support of Ameri-
can philanthropy does provide another rebuttal to the "chilling ef-
fect" arguments that have been so strenuously advanced.
62. 4 A.w. Scon, supra note 5, § 399.4, at 3123-24.
63. Kandell, Private Charity Going Out of Style in West Europe's Welfare States,
N.Y. Times, Jun. 30, 1978, at 1, 4.
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3. A Slippery Slope?
One additional concern about a cy pres order was that it could
not be 'contained: once the Buck Trust was opened up to extra-
Marin grants, it would be subject to a sea of demands from merito-
rious applicants from around the world. The trial court's opinion
in the Buck Trust case, for example, criticized the Foundation's
efficiency arguments on the ground that the "relative need" pre-
mise that they embraced would cause "all charitable gifts and the
fundamental basis of philanthropy [to] be threatened, as there
may always be more compelling 'needs' to fill than the gift chosen
by the testator .... Similarly, needs in the Bay Area cannot be
equated with the grueling poverty of India or the soul-wrenching
famine in Ethiopia."64 The court apparently assumed that notions
of efficiency or relative need would routinely be used to challenge
bequests, that "all charitable gifts" would be questioned on effi-
ciency grounds even in the absence of major surprise. That was
not the Foundation's position-certainly it is not mine-and it
would not conceivably have been the position of any court that ap-
proved a cy pres petition in circumstances similar to those present
in the Buck Trust case.
Moreover, in the Buck case itself, the "why not Ethiopia?" ri-
poste is answered by considering the meaning of "cy pres," which
is short for cy pres comme possible ("as close as possible" in Nor-
man French), thus, a modification as close as possible to the do-
nor's intention. Beryl Buck named as her trustee the Foundation,
which is committed to serving the five counties of the Bay Area.
Unless one makes the rather strenuous assumption that her choice
of the Foundation to carry out her charitable purposes had nothing
to do with the fact that it was the local community foundation,
some interpretive significance should attach to that selection. This
choice of trustee in fact provides an answer to the fear of an open-
ended Buck Trust modification, a plausible catch-point on the slip-
pery slope that otherwise could lead to Ethiopia and elsewhere. In
short, it might well have been concluded, with reference to the Bay
Area, that the Buck Trust stops here.611
64, In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259, slip op. at 97-98 n.6 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County
Aug. IS, 1986).
65. At a panel discussion on October 6, 1987 on the Buck Trust case, sponsored by the
New York University Institute on Federal Taxation, Daniel L. Kurtz responded to my pro-
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B. The National-International Share
It is this issue of the Bay Area as against the rest of the world
that prompts a final comment on the actual denouement of this
case. As noted, on the basis of an agreement among the Attorney
General, Marin County, and the Marin Council of Agencies, pro-
viding for major projects of "national and international importance
and significance," the court's July 1986 order requires that a share
of Buck Trust income (starting at 25 % and perpetually continuing
at 20%) be dedicated to one or more "major ... projects ... lo-
cated in Marin County, the benefits from which will inure not only
to Marin County but all of humankind."66
My first thought, upon receiving a vague and fragmentary ac-
count of this provision, was one of modest satisfaction. Some part
of Mrs. Buck's hugely swollen benefaction was to serve a purpose
larger than Marin County. Charity had begun at home, but some
part of large-scale charity was now going to reach beyond. To that
extent, the outcome of the case accommodated the fact of posthu-
mous surprise, Beryl Buck's probable adherence (had she lived
longer) to the "philanthropic standard," and the quest for efficient
disposition of charitable dollars. Moreover, this result would prob-
ably never have been achieved had the Foundation not commenced
the litigation. Accordingly, the cost and travail of this long and bit-
ter case were not a total loss.
These views are tempered, however, by disquieting second
thoughts, based on a reading of the court's orders of 1986 and
position along the following lines: If one argues that, had Mrs. Buck known about the true
size of her benefaction, she would have modified her geographic restrictions, then the same
reasoning might also suggest that, in this new wealth posture, she would not necessarily
have chosen the San Francisco Foundation as her distributive vehicle; she might well have
chosen a more broadly-based organization not limited to the Bay Area. Mr. Kurtz suggested,
therefore, that the choice of the -Foundation should not be treated as a given when dealing
with the "slippery slope" issue. The point is a strong one, but, for me, not dispositive. Once
cy pres is invoked, one searches for clues that will suggest what the donor might have
wanted as a next-closest outcome. The choice of the Foundation is a clue, not a powerful
one in the light of Mr. Kurtz's criticism, but better than no clue at all.
It should be noted that "the point urged by the Foundation was not that distribution
throughout five Bay Area counties was necessarily required (although that was the modifica-
tion which the Foundation, as trustee, proposed as representing a desirable cy pres alterna-
tive) but that, as opposed to maintaining the status quo, some type of modification was
appropriate in light of unanticipated developments subsequent to Mrs. Buck's death." Com-
munication from Stephen V. Bomse, supra note 14.
66. July 31 Order, supra note 59, at 8.
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1987, dealing with "major projects." The extraordinary command
role the court reserved for itself over the decision-making process,
discussed earlier, violates the basic concept of private philanthropy
and disregards the role assigned to charitable trustees in the non-
profit sector. Turning to the substance of the "major projects" or-
ders, they presumably seek to implement Mrs. Buck's expressed
intention, but serious doubts arise on this point. In its opinion on
the Foundation's cy pres petition, the court suggested that nation-
wide programs headquartered in Marin County would have pleased
the donor. This suggestion arose as part of the court's general find-
ing that Buck Trust funds could "continue to be spent effectively
and efficiently in Marin County"67 and that the Foundation had
dropped the ball during its stewardship. The court wrote that the
Foundation had improperly insisted that all Buck Trust grants
must "primarily benefit Marin County and its residents. "68 Thus
the Foundation had rejected grants for the National Guide Dogs
for the Blind organization, which is based in Marin; and for a na-
tionally-distributed children's television series produced by a Ma-
rin-based organization. The court wrote that "Mrs. Buck intended
and contemplated that, while the expenditures of the Buck Trust
would be limited to Marin, its benefits would and should extend
beyond Marin's border," citing, without further detail, trial testi-
mony by her lawyer.69
It was true enough that the Foundation, trying to honor what
it thought was a faithful interpretation of Mrs. Buck's language,
had refused to support national programs headquartered in Marin
County that did not primarily benefit Marin residents. This policy
was also directed against what the Foundation's Director referred
to as "carpetbaggers" trying to base their programs in Marin
67. In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259, slip op. at 111 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County Aug.
15, 1986).
68. Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 43-44. The cited testimony, by John Elliott Cook, in its entirety, is as follows:
Well, there is a matter of funding and there is a matter of the results of the
funding. The funding was due in Marin. Mrs. Buck wanted it there. She
wanted Marin to be identified as the area from which the Buck Trust arose.
. . . I have never suggested that all the money had to be spent in Marin be-
sides being the focus from which the benefit of that money funnel out from
Marin. That's her idea. She wanted that sort of identification throughout the
country even.
Trial Transcript at 8498-99, In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin
County).
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County in order to capture Buck Trust grants.70 Mrs. Buck's lan-
guage seemed to support the Foundation's position. She had di-
rected that income should be used "for exclusively non-profit char-
itable, religious or educational purposes in providing care for the
needy in Marin County, California, and for other non-profit chari-
table, religious or educational purposes in that county."71 Despite
her lawyer's trial testimony, this is not the language a testator
would use if she wished to support a national or international
grant program merely headquartered in Marin County. Instead,
the clear implication is that the Buck Trust was intended to help
the "needy" of Marin County and to provide other charitable, reli-
gious and educational assistance to the non-"needy" of that
county-in short, to confer benefit on Marin residents. Under the
terms of Mrs. Buck's will, therefore, it is, to put it mildly, very
difficult to justify a national-international "major projects"
scheme.
One might, however, explain the "major projects" order not as
a straightforward implementation of the Buck will but as the
court's effort to interpret what Mrs. Buck might have wanted to
do with some of her income if she knew its true magnitude. In that
context, the notion that she would have wanted some Buck Trust
funds to go to projects that do not primarily benefit Marin resi-
dents, but that assist larger national or international purposes,
would be an arguable inference. It must be observed, however, that
this explanation of the "major projects" order assumes that
changed circumstances have forced the court to look beyond the
express language of the testator and to search for the next-closest
solution. There is a name for this approach. It is called cy pres!
Assuming that the court in reality stepped into a cy pres
mode, the next question must be whether cy pres principles were
correctly applied. From Mrs. Buck's point of view, would the next-
closest solution take the form of grants to three national programs
on aging, on alcohol and drug abuse, and on education? One argu-
ment for this conclusion is that Marin County headquartering will
provide jobs to Marin County residents, although some of these
residents will surely be brand new ones. Another Marin-benefit ar-
70. In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259, slip op. at 44 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County Aug.
15, 1986).
71. Id. at 4.
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gument is suggested by a sentence in the July 25, 1986 agreement,
incorporated in the court's July 1986 order: "To the extent practi-
cal, such . . . projects . . . shall be consistent with her desire to
bring respect and admiration to Marin County."72 One may ask,
however, whether these contentions have much substance. Many or
most of the job openings created by the sophisticated research,
training and media institutions that receive "major projects" fund-
ing call for highly professional, technical or artistic qualifications.
Presumably, Marin County residents possessing these qualifica-
tions already have good jobs. Moreover, the trial court's canvass of
testimony regarding Mrs. Buck's feelings about Marin County
makes no reference to any "desire to bring respect and admira-
tion" to the county.73 In his trial testimony, Mrs. Buck's lawyer,
John Elliott Cook, referred, in brief and general terms, to her de-
sire to have "Marin ... identified as the area from which the ben-
efits under her charity arose."7. It is reasonable to assume that an-
yone who is fond of a place would like to see it acclaimed, but does
the Cook testimony establish that this was a salient feature of Mrs.
Buck's charitable outlook?
The point of these cavils is not that a national-international
projects program would have been wholly unpalatable to the donor
as a cy pres scheme. Rather, I mean to suggest that it is not obvi-
ous that these programs would have been preferred by the donor
over distributions to neighboring Bay Area counties served by the
Foundation. As noted above, the fact that she picked a community
foundation focused on the Bay Area as the instrument of her char-
ity cannot be ignored when shaping a cy pres solution.
My conjectures are under-informed, for the simple reason that
we have neither evidence nor argument bearing on the question of
what would be the solution cy pres comme possible. The reason, in
turn, for that lack of information is that there was never an adjudi-
cation that this was a proper case for cy pres. The Foundation
withdrew its petition before the trial was concluded. Moreover, in
the court's rejection of the intervenors' case, the court ruled that
cy pres was not available. Without a threshhold decision that cy
72. Agreement, supra note 59, at 6; July 31 Order, supra note 59, at 8.
73. In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259, slip op. at 4-10 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin County
Aug. 15, 1986).
74. Trial Transcript at 8498-99, In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin
County). See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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pres was available, the door was not open to evidence and argu-
ment about a precise cy pres solution, including the choice between
a Bay Area solution and a national-international projects solution.
And so, cy pres came to the Buck Trust after all, and at the
hands of a court that had emphatically rejected the Foundation's
cy pres petition. Cy pres came to the Buck Trust, however, not
under its own name or with full cy pres procedures, but in disguise
and lacking the inquiry that would help to insure a convincing fit
between the final outcome and the testator's preferences.
Muddled though the outcome was, it had its positive aspects.
For one thing, cy pres principles of surprise and charitable effi-
ciency seem to have been vindicated by the "major projects" order,
albeit in an indirect and flawed manner. Moreover, at a more sym-
bolic level there is another, favorable fallout from the Buck Trust
case.
A foundation, acting through its Distribution Committee, its
staff, and its counsel, has established an important precedent in
the annals of American philanthropy. It has faced up to the high-
est duty of trusteeship: to address difficult and novel dilemmas in-
volving the fiduciary mission, to do so in a way that seeks to re-
spect both the donor and the public interest, and then, having
resolved the dilemma, to act upon that resolution, regardless of
slings and arrows. It may well be the case that the Foundation
could better have managed its relationships with its relevant con-
stituencies, including Marin County officialdom. But in discharging
its substantive duties, the Foundation has set a standard for other
charitable institutions and for other trustees, both eleemosynary
and corporate, to heed. The health of the American nonprofit
world, and of the private sector in general, is a bit more robust
because the Foundation grasped the nettle in the Buck Trust case.
A congeries of pressures, some of them disreputable and all of
them powerful, forced the Foundation to withdraw short of the fi-
nal goal, but its effort to that point, in my view, merits the philan-
thropic equivalent of the Medal of Honor-plus, of course, the
Purple Heart.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
GEOGRAPHIC AND SUBJECT MATTER SCOPE
OF THE 63 LARGEST U.S. FOUNDATIONS
[Vol. 21
Notes: Foundations included are those listed in The
Foundation Directory as either among the 50 largest
foundations by assets or among the 50 largest
foundations by annual giving. Fiscal year reporting
periods vary, but all fiscal years end in 1981 or 1982.
Foundations from the annual giving rankings are listed
first, in descending order of annual giving. Those
foundations included in the assets rankings but not in
the annual givings rankings are then listed, in
descending order of asset size.
Sources: The Foundation Directory (9th ed.) for dollar amounts.
Information in the "Geographic/Subject Matter Scope"
column is abstracted from The Foundation Directory
summaries as supplemented by information provided by
Source Book Profiles (which, like the Directory, is
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Annual Grants
Geographic Scope Assets
Foundation Subject Matter Scope (in Millions)
Johnson (Robert Wood) United States. 42.0
Foundation Improvement of 1,421.1
health services.
Moody Foundation Texas. 37.5
Broad purposes. 225.0
Duke Endowment North and South Carolina. 36.7
Broad purposes. 462.7
Atlantic Richfield Mainly in areas of 32.3
Foundation company operations. 12.5
Broad purposes.
Kresge Foundation No limitations. 32.3
Broad purposes. 681.5
MacArthur (John D. No limitations. 31.8
and Catherine) Broad purposes. 928.0
Foundation
San Francisco San Francisco Bay Area. 30.1
Foundation Broad purposes. 377.5
Exxon Education United States. 26.0
Foundation Education. 52.3
McKnight Foundation No limitations except for 24.8
emphasis on Twin Cities 338.1
Metropolitan area and
Minnesota with respect to social
and human service grants.
Human and social services,
neuroscience research, and basic
plant biology research.
Keck (W.M.) Foundation Primarily California. 23.8
Broad purposes. 460.0
Mott (Charles Stewart) No limitations. 23.0
Foundation Broad purposes. 471.3
New York Community Priority to New York City area. 22.8
Trust Broad purposes. 302.5
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No limitations; some emphasis on
Boston-Cambridge area.
Broad purposes.
United States and certain
countries that have been
members of the British Overseas
Commonwealth.
Broad purposes.
No limitations; some emphasis on
communities where Shell
employees reside.
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Annual Grants
Geographic Scope Assets
Foundation Subject Matter Scope (in Millions)
Welch (Robert A.) Texas. 13.2
Foundation Broad purposes; emphasis on 144.5
chemistry education and
research.
Irvine (James) California. 13.0
Foundation Broad purposes. 234.7
Amoco Foundation, Inc. No limitations. 12.9
Emphasis on higher education. 49.7
General Motors No limitations. 12.8
Foundation Broad purposes. 80.2
Krannert Charitable Primarily Indiana. 12.7
Trust Broad purposes. 44.0
Hewlett (William and No limitations, except for regional 12.4
Flora) Foundation grants program, which is limited 531.5
to the S.F. Bay Area.
Broad purposes.
Clark (Edna McConnell) No limitations. 12.3





penal system; controlling and
curing schistosomiasis.
Noble (Samuel Roberts) Primarily Southwest, with 12.3
Foundation, Inc. Oklahoma emphasis. 257.7
Broad purposes.
Mabee (J.E. and L.E.) Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, 12.0
Foundation, Inc. Arkansas, Missouri and New 359.1
Mexico.
Broad purposes.
General Electric Foundation U.S. and possessions. 11.3
Broad purposes. 44.1
Mobil Foundation, Inc. Areas of company operations. 11.3
Broad purposes. 13.5
Chicago Community Trust Cook County, Illinois. 11.3
Broad purposes. 126.7
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Annual Grants
Geographic Scope Assets
Foundation Subject Matter Scope (in Millions)
Tandy (Anne Burnett) and Primarily Fort Worth and Texas. 1.1
Charles D. Tandy Broad purposes. 165.8
Foundation
DeRance, Inc. No limitations. 9.5
Broad purposes. 151.4
Simon (Norton), Inc. No limitations. 0.4
Museum of Art Broad purposes. 147.3
(Primarily an operating
foundation which purchases and
lends works of art).
Meyer (Fred) Primarily Northwest. 1.0
Charitable Trust Broad purposes. 142.8
Murdock (M.J.) Northwest. 8.4
Charitable Trust . Broad purposes. 140.8
Alcoa Foundation Primarily in areas of company 7.8
operations. 140.6
Broad purposes.
Ahmanson Foundation, Inc. Primarily Los Angeles and 9.8
Southern California. 139.6
Broad purposes.
Myrin (Mabel Pew) Primarily Philadelphia, 9.4
Trust Pennsylvania. 130.7
Emphasis on education and local
cultural programs.
Commonwealth Fund No limitations. 7.8
Largely health care. 129.8
HeinOnline -- 21 U.S.F. L. Rev.  676 1986-1987
676 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
TABLE 2
GIFTS AND BEQUESTS MADE TO FOUNDATIONS
DURING THE PAST THIRTY YEARS
EXCEEDING $30 MILLION
Note: This schedule does not purport to be exhaustive. It
does, however, include all gifts and bequests set forth in
the sources listed below.
Sources: Giving USA and data furnished by Dr. Ralph Nelson of
City University of New York. Geographic and subject
matter scope are abstracted from The Foundation
Directory (9th ed.).
Geographic Amount of
Scope Gift or Year of
Subject Matter Donor Bequest Gift or
Foundation Scope Gift/Bequest (in Millions) Bequest
Hartford (John No limitations. John A. Hartford 53.4 1954
A.) Foundation Broad purposes. Bequest.
Fleischmann No limitations. Max C. Fleischmann 45.7 1955
(Max C.) Broad purposes. Bequest.
Foundation
Sloan (Alfred See Table 1 Mrs. Alfred P. 73.0 1957
P.) Sloan
Foundation Bequest.
Astor (Vincent) Primarily N.Y.C. Vincent Astor 34.8 1959
Foundation Broad purposes. Bequest.
Moody See Table 1 William L. Moody, 100.0 1959
Foundation, Inc. Jr.
Bequest.
Rockefeller See Table 1 John D. 65.3 1960
Brothers Fund Rockefeller, Jr.
Bequest.
Brown See Table 1 Herman Brown 43.0 1962
Foundation, Gift.
Inc.
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Geographic Amount of
Scope Gift or Year of
Subject Matter Donor Bequest Gift or
Foundation Scope GiftlBequest (in Millions) Bequest
Mott (Charles See Table 1 C.S. Mott 195.6 1963
Stewart) Gift.
Foundation
Astor (Vincent) Primarily N.Y.C. Vincent Astor 30.8 1963
Foundation Broad purposes. Bequest.
Kenan (William United States. William R Kenan 95.0 1965
R, Jr.) Education. Bequest.
Charitable
Trust
Clark (Edna See Table 1 Mr. and Mrs. 40.0 1966
McConnell) Van Alan Clark
Foundation Gift.
Scaife (Sarah) No limiation; Mrs. Sarah Mellon 65.7 1966
Foundation some emphasis Scaife
on Pittsburgh. Bequest.
Broad purposes.
Sloan See Table 1 Alfred P. Sloan 30.2 1966
(Alfred P.) Bequest.
Foundation
Luce (Henry) No limitations. Henry Luce 68.6 1967
Foundation Broad areas of Bequest.
public affairs.
Rowland See Table 1 Edwin H. Land 107.6 1968
Foundation, Gift.
Inc.
Bush See Table 1 Archibald G. Bush 45.8 1968
Foundation, Bequest.
Inc.




Brown (James Primarily James Graham 100.0 1969
Graham) Louisville and Brown
Foundation Kentucky. Bequest.
Broad purposes.
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Geographic Amount of
Scope Gift or Year of
Subject Matter Donor Bequest Gift or
Foundation Scope Gift/Bequest (in Millions) Bequest




Mellon See Table 1 Mrs. Ailsa 376.0 1970
(Andrew W.) Mellon Bruce
Foundation Bequest.
Kennedy No limitations. Joseph P. Kennedy 200.0 1970




Johnson See Table 1 Robert Wood 1,004.0 1971
(Robert Wood) Johnson
Foundation Bequest.
Pew (J. Howard) See Table 1 J. Howard Pew 80.0 1971
Freedom Trust Bequest.
Mellon Largely Richard King 63.7 1972
(Richard King) Pittsburgh Mellon






Dodge Emphasis on Geraldine 85.0 1973
(Geraldine R.), New Jersey. Rockefeller
Inc. Broad purposes. Dodge
Bequest.
Mott (Charles See Table 1 Charles Stewart 40.0 1973
Stewart) Mott
Foundation Bequest.
Murdock (M.J.) See Table 1 M.J. Murdock 100.0 1975
Charitable Bequest.
Trust
MacArthur See Table 1 John D. 1,000.0 1978
(John D. and MacArthur
Catherine) Bequest.
Foundation
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Geographic Amount of
Scope Gift or Year of
Subject Matter Donor Bequest Gift or
Foundation Scope GiftlBequest (in Millions) Bequest
McKnight See Table 1 William L. 128.9 1981
Foundation McKnight
Bequest.
Meyer (Fred) See Table 1 Fred Meyer 120.2 1981
Charitable Bequest.
Trust
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